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Departmentalism—the ability and right of each branch of the
federal government to interpret the Constitution for itself—has a
1
long and often honorable history. But within the past seven decades
the Supreme Court has come to dominate constitutional interpretation, and more recently has made clear that it intends to keep the
Constitution as its own preserve. If a successful case or controversy
can be framed, then when faced with claims for independent constitutional interpretation from other branches, the Court may assert
that it defers when it agrees with that branch’s interpretation, but the
deference disappears when it disagrees.
I
Three months after his landslide 1936 reelection victory, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed expanding the number of Supreme Court justices from nine to fifteen. The Court-packing plan
was a direct response to a conservative majority on the Court that had
invalidated ten major New Deal statutes, including its industrial and
agricultural centerpieces, in the previous two years and seemed
poised to finish off the rest of the New Deal in the next year or so.
A cartoon shows FDR rehearsing his six new smiling justices. He
instructs: “Great! Now, once more, all together.” The six exclaim
“Yes!” in unison. The Constitution and the Scales of Justice are par2
tially visible in a trash barrel. The cartoon was spot on. Not only
Republicans, but also a number of Progressives believed that Roose-
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velt, who had already dominated Congress, was intent on removing
the last check on his rule. FDR did not see it that way (or so he asserted). What he opposed was not the Court or the Constitution, but
rather the Court’s highly restrictive interpretations of the Constitution. As he told an aide right after the second inaugural, “[w]hen the
Chief Justice read me the oath and came to the words ‘support the
Constitution of the United States’ I felt like saying: ‘Yes, but it’s the
Constitution as I understand it, flexible enough to meet any new
problem of democracy—not the kind of Constitution your Court has
3
raised up as a barrier to progress and democracy.’”
The Court-packing plan was decisively defeated. Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes, who had been instrumental in its defeat, kept
his nine-member Court, but the attack on the Court plus multiple
appointments gave FDR the Constitution he wanted. No further New
Deal statutes were invalidated.
Attorney General Robert Jackson wrote that “[w]hat we demanded for our generation was the right consciously to influence the
evolutionary process of constitutional law, as other generations had
4
5
done.” Justice Robert Jackson’s Wickard v. Filburn opinion helped
turn evolution into revolution.
The summer after Wickard, FDR gave a Fireside Chat on inflation,
the need for wage and price controls, and the necessity of rationing.
He asked Congress for appropriate legislation, but “[i]n the event
that the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept
the responsibility, and I will act. . . . The President has the powers,
under the Constitution and under Congressional Acts, to take measures necessary to avert a disaster which would interfere with the win6
ning of the war.” After noting that war-time responsibilities were
“very grave,” he stated that he could not tell what powers would be
7
needed to win the war. He then added:
The American people can be sure that I will use my powers with a full
sense of my responsibility to the Constitution and to my country. The
American people can also be sure that I shall not hesitate to use every
power vested in me to accomplish the defeat of our enemies . . . . When
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the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the
8
people—to whom they belong.

FDR had already exercised ample war powers. He had authorized
the internment of all persons of Japanese descent on the West Coast.
Closer to the Fireside Chat was the military trial of eight Nazis who
were quickly captured after being put ashore by submarines to sabotage industrial facilities. Roosevelt ordered them tried in secret by an
appointed military court without recourse to courts. Both of these
actions resulted in Supreme Court opinions rubber-stamping the
President’s acts.
The saboteurs’ military defense counsel argued that Ex parte Milli9
gan, where after the Civil War, the Court held courts martial could
not try civilians while civil courts were open, afforded the defendants
the right to be tried before civil courts. After three weeks of the military trial, but before the inevitable verdict, the Court rushed into a
special summer session to hear the case. Attorney General Francis
Biddle had privately told several members of the Court that Roosevelt
would order executions regardless of what the Court held. Even
though all justices had qualms about the procedure, they unani10
mously upheld the administration’s act.
The Court rendered its judgment two days after hearing the case;
three days later the military commission found the defendants guilty,
and within a week, six of the eight were executed. Speed on the habeas appeal was demanded by the President and a howling national
press (although the Court could not write its opinion anywhere near
as rapidly, hence it came down some months later). The saboteurs
got what they should have expected if captured, but the procedure
did not look pretty despite contemporary flag waving by the press,
nicely illustrated by a self-congratulatory editorial in The New Republic:
“[E]ven in wartime and even toward the enemy, we do not abandon
11
our basic protection of individual rights.”
The relocation and confinement of 112,000 people of Japanese
descent, most of whom were American citizens, was the biggest single
blight on civil liberties in America in the twentieth century. Spurred
by public fears after the attack on Pearl Harbor, long-standing prejudice against Asians, as well as national newspaper columnists, Roosevelt and then Congress authorized the War Department to declare
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certain areas as military zones and thereafter the commander of the
area could impose curfews, travel restrictions, and order people excluded entirely from the area.
General John DeWitt, who commanded the West Coast, first imposed a curfew on all people of Japanese descent. In an Orwellian
twist, the order referred to Japanese American citizens as “non12
alien[s].” DeWitt followed with an order prohibiting those covered
from leaving the West Coast. Three weeks later he excluded them
from the West Coast. Forbidden to leave, forbidden to stay, the only
legal option was to leave jobs, homes, and possessions behind (or unload them at distress prices) and to report for internment, mainly in
the arid west, in one of ten god-forsaken, dust-blown, barbed-wire
fenced camps.
The curfew made sense pending determinations of the situation
of who was loyal and who was not, but DeWitt had no intention of
making those determinations, and Biddle’s legal objections and FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover’s conclusion that there was no evidence that
any Japanese Americans were engaged in sabotage were brushed
aside by FDR. The exclusion order meant that all Japanese Americans would be interred because, as DeWitt so delicately pronounced:
13
“[A] Jap is a Jap.”
A month before the 1944 presidential election, the Court heard
oral arguments on the detention involving Fred Korematsu’s crime of
violating the exclusion order, described by Jackson as “being present
in the state whereof he is a citizen, near the place where he was born,
14
and where all his life he has lived.” Six justices joined Black’s opinion that despite some rousing language—racial classifications “are
immediately suspect” and must be subject “to the most rigid scru15
tiny” —justified the detention on the ground that war is hell.
There were dissents. Owen Roberts found that the Catch-22 of
the orders violated due process. Murphy accurately characterized the
16
program as having descended “into the ugly abyss of racism.” The
most interesting was Jackson’s conclusion that courts should abstain
from reviewing the constitutionality of military orders because the
outcome was fore-ordained: the pressures of war would cause the
courts to validate the orders by “distort[ing] the Constitution to ap-
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prove all that the military may deem expedient.”
That had explained the World War I cases as well as those already decided during
the current war. Jackson recognized that the military was carrying
out a military program, not worrying about the niceties of the Constitution, but “[a] military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to
18
last longer than the military emergency.” When a court validates the
order it offers “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every
repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking
19
and expands it to new purposes.”
FDR did not live to return his wartime powers to the people. Because World War II merged almost seamlessly into the Cold War, the
Court would spend decades trying to reclaim them. As Jackson
noted, precedents matter.
II
During the Korean War, President Harry Truman tested that presidential authority when he ordered the steel mills seized to avert a
strike that he claimed would adversely affect defense production.
Truman claimed that the president’s executive authority justified his
actions and noted that presidents from Lincoln to FDR had similarly
exercised such a power. At trial, the U.S. Attorney asserted that while
Congressional powers were limited by the Constitution, presidential
powers were not. Thus there was no judicial role (except to validate
Truman’s position). If there were objections, then elections or impeachment were the only remedies. It was not a winning argument
and even when abandoned at the Court, Truman lost.
Hugo Black’s majority opinion made short work of Truman’s
claims. “The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivo20
cal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.” A
sophisticated concurring opinion by Jackson noted that the president’s powers were at their lowest ebb when there was a conflicting
legislative policy (as here) and at their highest when acting pursuant
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to an express or implied Congressional policy.
He counseled
against leveraging the president’s largely unchecked foreign affairs
powers into the domestic sphere “by his own commitment of the Na22
tion’s armed forces to some foreign venture.”
Truman took the defeat badly in no small part because Chief Justice Fred Vinson, one of his four appointees to the Court, had advised
him that a majority of the Court would back him and because two
former attorneys general, FDR’s Jackson and Truman’s Tom Clark,
had justified seizures while in the executive office. Indeed, Jackson
had gone farther and in 1940 approved the excellent, but probably
illegal, destroyers for bases deal with Great Britain. Yet both voted
against Truman in the Steel Seizure case. One of Jackson’s law clerks,
William Rehnquist, attributed the loss to the related unpopularity of
23
both Truman and the Korean War. Bringing the presidency back
into the Constitution also played a role.
III
Five years later, the Court found itself on the receiving end of a
struggle over constitutional interpretation of the right of selfpreservation against communists. After Senator Joseph McCarthy
had been condemned by the Senate in December, 1954, the Court
interpreted the action as signaling a waning of domestic anticommunism. Thus, in 1955, the Court cut back on summary dismissals from civil service on loyalty grounds by limiting them to employ24
ees who had access to sensitive information. More significant were
25
two state cases, Pennsylvania v. Nelson and Slochower v. Board of Higher
26
Education of New York City, both decided a year later. Nelson reversed
the sedition conviction of Steve Nelson, the leader of the Communist
Party in Western Pennsylvania, on the ground that the state law was
preempted by the various federal statutes dealing with communists.
In Slochower the Court invalidated New York’s policy of treating the
invocation of the right against self-incrimination when questioned
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Jackson’s much-celebrated twilight zone (where there is no announced Congressional
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about employment duties as a resignation. Seemingly ending the penalization of Fifth Amendment Communists, the Court ruled that because there were innocent reasons for pleading the Fifth, a state
could not so penalize its use. These decisions provoked outcries from
Southerners and national security conservatives, but were greeted
with satisfaction by civil libertarians as signaling the end of judicial
acquiescence to McCarthyism. The signal was unmistakable in the
1956 Term when the Court decided twelve cases dealing with communists or communism, and the government parties lost each time.
The Eighty-Fifth Congress, then in session, proved that just because McCarthy was dead (having drunk himself into the grave in early 1957), it didn’t mean that anti-communism was also dead. The
1957 decisions caused the state attorneys general as well as the American Bar Association to join Congressional national security conservatives in sharp criticism of the Court. A number of bills were quickly
introduced to curb the Court, but in the summer of 1957 little could
be done because Congress was focused almost entirely on what would
27
become the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Thus, while Congress was not
in a position to do much more than verbally trounce the Court, it
nevertheless hurriedly passed the Jencks Act (on defendants’ access
to FBI interview notes of witnesses testifying against them) at the demand of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover. Although the Act basically
28
codified one of the 1957 decisions, it was opposed by the Court’s defenders and seen by all as a slap at the Court.
The second session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress had time to consider Court-curbing bills even as the Court allowed states again to discharge Fifth Amendment Communists—this time on the grounds of
29
incompetence. The House passed measures, which created a presumption against finding that a federal statute preempted state counterparts; rewrote the Smith Act provisions on “organizing;” and authorized summary discharges of nonsensitive government personnel
for security reasons. Senate action focused on William Jenner’s proposal to strip the Court of jurisdiction in all the areas where it had in-
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terfered with the anti-communist programs. There was too much
opposition, and Senator John Marshall Butler offered an amendment
to Jenner’s bill that would limit jurisdiction-stripping to admissions to
the legal profession, but also undo an important holding limiting the
House UnAmerican Activities Committee, rewrite the Smith Act on
organizing, and change the preemption doctrine.
Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson tried to prevent any votes
on anti-Court measures and was successful until the end of the session neared. Jenner-Butler was ultimately tabled by a 49-41 vote, but
that was accompanied by a tremendous amount of anti-Court feeling.
Immediately on the heels of that, a motion to table the House proposals failed 39-45. There was pandemonium in the Senate, but
Johnson secured a recess until the next day and between his armtwisting and that of organized labor, enough votes were changed for
the motion to recommit to pass 41-40. Even though no anti-Court
measure had passed, the Court had been slapped about harder than
30
during FDR’s Court-packing fight.
Even the state chief justices piled on, adopting by a 36-8 vote a
critical report on the Court that claimed “considerable doubt” that
31
America was still a government of laws and not of men.
A clear message had been sent, and the Court, or at least a five32
man bloc of the Court, got it. Congressman Wint Smith had stated
33
that “[t]he Court is simply blind to the reality of our times.” The
second session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress gave it vision. The rout
had morphed the jurisprudence of 1961 into that of 1951 when the
Court had sustained any repression the federal government authorized.
Immediately after the Eighty-Fifth Congress had finished with its
verbal bashing, the Court heard arguments in the Little Rock desegregation case. Massive resistance had come to Arkansas in 1957 when
Governor Orval Faubus called out the National Guard to prevent
nine Negro students from entering the previously all-white 2000 student Central High School in Little Rock pursuant to a court-ordered
plan. When a federal judge ordered the Guard removed, their place
was taken by a shrieking mob. After three weeks of horrible international publicity during which time the Secretary of State complained
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to Attorney General Herbert Brownell that Little Rock was ruining
American foreign policy, Eisenhower sent in the 101st Airborne to
enforce the court-ordered desegregation plan.
34
Little Rock came to the Court in Cooper v. Aaron at a special
summer session the next year over the issue of whether the “chaos,
bedlam and turmoil” around Central justified postponing even the
35
limited desegregation for a couple of years. The outcome was overdetermined. If President Dwight Eisenhower, who Warren (wrongly)
36
thought was opposed to Brown v. Board of Education, could protect
court-ordered desegregation with troops, the Court could not rule
that he acted in vain. Furthermore to do otherwise would signal to
every other Southern state that adopting a policy of violence at the
first hint of desegregation was the road to legal salvation. A battered
Court (this being immediately after the second session of the EightyFifth Congress) ended the opinion with a bravado boast of its own
potency. In an unprecedented move, the opinion of the Court listed
all nine justices as its authors and for the first time equated the Constitution with its own pronouncements. Thus it claimed that when a
public official—like Faubus—took the oath to support the Constitution, the official was duty-bound to support the Court’s interpretations.
This was an unprecedented claim of judicial authority. Obviously
parties are bound by the judgment of the Court, but in Cooper the
Court held nonparties—if they had taken an oath to support the
Constitution as all public officials do—were bound. Nevertheless,
this was the boasting of the weak. In its wake the Court summarily affirmed the validity of Alabama’s Pupil Placement Law, a cornerstone
of that state’s policy of massive resistance. The justices adopted the
reasoning of the court below, which opined that the court could not
conclude “in advance of its application, that the Alabama Law will not
37
be properly and constitutionally administered.” Actually they could,
but Alabama would have ignored any court decision, and Eisenhower
was not going to send the army in everywhere—indeed anywhere
again—in the South. Just as in the domestic security area, the Court
was defeated (albeit temporarily).
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IV
In 1958 the Court had been confronted by a Congress dominated
by a coalition of Republicans and conservative (mostly Southern)
Democrats. In the mid-1960s, the Republicans shifted to support
Northern Democrats and defeat Southern filibusters in order to pass
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That
the Court viewed this new coalition with equanimity was apparent in
38
Katzenbach v. Morgan where it sustained section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act that enfranchised any citizen who had completed the sixth
grade in a Puerto Rican school where the instruction was in Spanish
even if the person could not read or write English. The problem for
4(e) was that in 1959 a unanimous Court in Lassiter v. Northampton
39
County Board of Elections held that the ability to read English was not
an unreasonable requirement for voting.
Katzenbach v. Morgan offered two rationales why 4(e) was constitutional (the first being voting to cure a discrimination in the provision
of municipal services). The second was expansive as the Court stated
“the result is no different if we confine our inquiry to the question
whether section 4(e) was merely legislation aimed at the elimination
40
of invidious discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.” But
Lassiter held English literacy was not an invidious discrimination. In
the next paragraph the Court offered sentences stating the “Congress
41
might well have” which viewed Congress as having an identical and
independent ability to interpret the Constitution and supercede the
Court’s contrary judgment.
Cooper held all public officials were bound by the Court’s pronouncements. Katzenbach v. Morgan held that the Court’s decisions
were subject to legislative reversal when the Congress was expanding
rights. The contrast could only be explained by the Court’s enthusiasm over Congressional concern for minorities and the confident belief that liberalism was destined to dominate.
Katzenbach v. Morgan was indeed aberrational and three years later
42
in Powell v. McCormack the Court reverted to Cooper in rejecting a
claim of legislative primacy in interpreting Article I, Section 5 allowing Congress to judge the qualification of its own members. The
House had excluded Adam Clayton Powell from taking his seat for

38

41
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360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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See id. at 654.
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wrongly diverting House funds and making false reports to the
House. The Court held that the Qualifications Clause limited the
House to judging age, citizenship, and residence as expressed in Article I, Section 2 and thus the House could add no other qualifications.
The Court took a similar position of adhering to Cooper when confronted with President Richard Nixon’s claim of executive privilege as
ground for refusing to comply with a subpoena for tape recordings of
White House meetings in the aftermath of the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex in 1972. The Court claimed that the scope of executive privilege
was subject to the judicial power to say what the law is and therefore
43
could not be shared with another branch.
Less than three weeks later, Nixon resigned. After swearing in
President Gerald Ford, Burger expressed relief that “[the system]
44
worked,” and Time magazine enthusiastically agreed. How myopic
they were. If there had been no taping system—or if Nixon had destroyed the tapes (and it remains inexplicable that he did not)—then
Watergate would have been a swearing contest between the President
of the United States and his youthful former White House counsel
John Dean, a man who looked every inch the snake that he was. It
would have been no contest; even long-time Nixon haters would not
have sided with Dean.
Nor did the Court play a great or heroic role. The House Judiciary Committee acted without the benefit of the tapes at issue and the
House was sure to follow. What the Court did was revert to what it
traditionally does—piling on to facilitate what is already happening.
Nevertheless, the Court got a lot of good publicity and, in the Courtcentered world of lawyers, a lot of credit. Thus, a decade later after
Attorney General Edwin Meese targeted Cooper v. Aaron, a cascade of
anathemas, pronounced by leaders of the bar, prominent academics,
and columnists, rained down upon Meese. Everyone claimed Meese’s
position would undermine the rule of law. When he publicly recanted less than three weeks later it helped seal the Court’s primacy
over the Constitution (something easily demonstrated when the
Court told President Bill Clinton that he could not delay until after
45
his presidency a deposition in a pending civil suit ).

43
44
45

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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Equally as important as Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s refusal to
47
overrule Roe v. Wade was what the opinion by Justices Sandra
O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter said about the role
of the Court in American society. According to the troika, the Court
could not overrule Roe because to do so would destroy the essential
perceptions of the American people about the Court. That would be
too traumatic for everyone. The troika claimed that occasionally, as
in Roe, the Court “decides a case in such a way as to resolve . . . [an]
48
intensely divisive controversy.” These cases have a “dimension” that
a routine case does not, one that is “present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a com49
mon mandate rooted in the Constitution.”
The troika’s opinion in Casey is the most pretentious in the United
States Reports. It asserted that the belief of Americans of themselves as
a people who live according to the rule of law “[was] not readily separable from their understanding of the Court . . . speak[ing] before all
50
others for their constitutional ideals.”
Before meant way above.
Thus “[i]f the Court’s legitimacy should be undermined, then, so
would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals. The Court’s concern with legitimacy is not for the
51
sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation . . . .” As if the
American people (the vast majority of whom cannot name two sitting
justices) spend their time thinking about the issue. The troika spoke
as if to say “we do it all for you, our people.” And despite the contempt of Antonin Scalia’s dissent, there was no disagreement among
the Brethren with regard to the troika’s essential position on the role
of the Court—“we’re number one.”
The troika’s opinion did Cooper v. Aaron one better. Under assault
from the South, Cooper held that all public officials were bound by
Brown. Under assault from Republicans, the troika stated that all
Americans must fall in step with the Court and cease fighting over
Roe.

46
47
48
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505 U.S. 833 (1992)
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 866.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 868.
Id.
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The full Court showed it was serious about its primacy when it
struck down federal statutes designed to overrule two 5-4 decisions.
52
One was the 1990 holding in Employment Division v. Smith that free
exercise claims could be trumped by any law that does not specifically
target religion. The other was the Warren Court edict Miranda v. Ari53
zona with its notorious Miranda warnings.
Almost immediately after Smith was decided, efforts began to return free exercise claims to their former status, and these bore fruit
in 1993 with passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). Congress thoroughly vetted the constitutional issues involving Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and was explicit in its
intent to use Section 5 to return to the pre-Smith compelling state interest standard. With the support of both religious and civil liberties
groups, RFRA passed the House unanimously and the Senate 97-3.
In holding RFRA unconstitutional (as applied to states) Justice
Kennedy tersely held that Section 5 gave Congress power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, and “[l]egislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing
the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
54
changing what the right is.” RFRA, by protecting religious conduct
more generously than Smith did, was implementing a Congressional
policy rather than enforcing the Constitution. Hence RFRA was beyond Congressional authority.
The Court said that because Congress was aware of the decision in
Smith it had to know that “the Court will treat its precedents with the
respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and
55
contrary expectations must be disappointed.”
The Constitution
works best “when each part of the Government respects both the
Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other
56
branches.” In other words, Congress should know its place and recognize judicial supremacy, and the Court should keep Congress in its
subordinate place.
Meanwhile, Miranda had been unpopular with millions of Americans from the instant it was decided in 1966. Headlines proclaiming
57
“Confessed Slayer of Wife and 5 Children Freed” will do that.
Summer riots, an escalating crime wave, the quagmire in Vietnam,

52
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494 U.S. 872 (1990).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 535–36 (Stevens, J., concurring).
FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 185 (1970).
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and an impending presidential election led to the Omnibus Crime
58
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, with a provision specifically
contrary to Miranda. If a judge found a confession was voluntary,
based on the totality of the circumstances, then the statute proclaimed it was admissible against the defendant even if no warnings
about constitutional rights had been given.
After three decades of nonenforcement, a federal appeals court
admitted a suppressed, voluntary, but unmirandized confession based
on the 1968 law. Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy were
on the record as opposing Miranda’s rule, but the three nevertheless
refused to overrule. Rehnquist’s opinion in Dickerson v. United States
bluntly stated that “Congress may not legislatively supersede our deci59
sions interpreting and applying the Constitution.” Since Miranda
applied a constitutional rule, Congress could not overrule it. Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy did not like Miranda one bit, but they
liked the thought of Congress gutting a Supreme Court decision far
less. Thus Miranda went from 5-4 at the height of the Warren Court
to 7-2 (Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting) at the Rehnquist
Court. If it was not for judicial imperialism, such a result simply
could not be possible.
VI
Beginning in 2004, the imperial Court faced the imperial presidency in time of war. With the war on terror and Americans fighting
in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the government claimed to need a lot.
Indeed, President George W. Bush and his administration were making claims of executive authority not seen since World War II (if
then).
After September 11, 2001, administration lawyers studying legal issues that would be forthcoming agreed unanimously on only one issue—those captured would be held outside the United States (and
therefore hopefully outside the law of the United States). Ultimately
they decided captives were not to be criminal defendants where they
would get a lawyer and a trial. Nor were they to be prisoners of war
where they would be entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conventions (which the White House counsel Alberto Gonzales deemed
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obsolete, quaint and inapplicable ). Instead, they were enemy combatants to be held indefinitely for interrogation.
A pair of major problems for Bush’s claims came from sequencing
and timing. The first round of cases involved American citizens
treated as if they had no rights. The next two rounds came after
Bush was widely deemed to be incompetent.
The initial pair of cases to arise asked (1) whether an American
citizen, captured in Afghanistan, could be held as an enemy combatant and denied an opportunity to prove his detention was wrongful,
and (2) whether non-citizens detained abroad had the right to access
American courts via habeas corpus to test the legality of their confinement. The evening of arguments for the former, CBS News
broke the story of abuses at Abu Ghraib, and while the opinions were
being written the so-called “torture memo” of the Justice Department
61
was released. It claimed the President had the inherent authority to
override a Congressional ban on torture. Neither helped the Bush
administration.
In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that there was pre-existing statutory jurisdiction to review the detention of non-citizens held at the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion also
claimed that the allegations—that those seeking habeas had neither
engaged in combat nor acts of terrorism against the United States
and were held in detention without access to counsel or charges of
wrong-doing—“unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the
62
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”
If non-citizens had a right to access to a federal court, then, a fortiori, citizens, even those detained as enemy combatants (a category
defined specifically to fit the facts of battlefield capture), had at least
that right also, and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld said so. With the exception of
Thomas, the justices were unimpressed by the executive’s claim that
separation of powers principles meant that courts should have no
role in this aspect of the war on terror.
No opinion garnered a majority of the justices. Justice O’Connor
for Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer emphasized that the Congressional authorization of the use of force authorized detention but
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might not authorize prolonged detention, which “carries the poten63
tial to become a means for oppression and abuse.” She also concluded that due process required some ability to contest the facts
supporting detention. Thus there had to be a fair hearing before a
neutral tribunal. Souter, with Ginsburg, found that only a clear expression of Congressional intent could justify holding an American
citizen without trial, and that the authorization of force was not such
a declaration. Scalia, with Stevens, went farther and concluded that,
to hold an American, the government must either try him criminally
or else obtain a statutory suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
Thomas’s lone dissent tracked the Bush Administration position—
the judiciary lacked the expertise to second-guess the executive. So
long as the executive was acting in good faith to defend the public, it
had plenary authority to detain a citizen captured abroad.
Immediately after the decision, the Defense Department created
tribunals to review the status of all the detainees at Guantanamo, and
the government released Hamdi to Saudi Arabia (after he renounced
his American citizenship). After holding him without charges for
three years, the government stated he no longer posed a threat to the
United States. That pattern would replay itself again and again.
Before the Court heard another war on terror case, two separate
developments occurred. First, there were leaks to the news media of
64
heretofore secret and perhaps illegal programs. The second development was passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which
required adherence to the Geneva Conventions but also withdrew jurisdiction of federal courts to hear habeas petitions by Guantanamo
65
detainees. In combination, these developments suggested an Executive Branch that believed it could fight the war on terror without
Congressional help (or oversight) and a (Republican) Congress that
believed the judiciary should keep out of it.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld was a habeas challenge to the military tribu66
nals created to try detainees. Hamdan, arrested in November 2001,
but not charged until after Hamdi, challenged both the definition of
the substantive offense he was charged with—joining an enterprise
dedicated to attacking civilians—as well as the structures and procedures of the military commissions. The Court, over dissents by Tho-
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mas, Scalia, and Alito (Roberts being disqualified because he had
participated in the opinion below anticipating the position of the dissenters), first concluded that the DTA did not apply to Hamdan’s
case. The majority then held that Congress had not authorized the
tribunals, and, indeed, they were contrary to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. In an extraordinary
declaration, the Court stated “the Executive is bound to comply with
the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction,” thereby making
clear that the Executive was not acting in accordance with the “Rule
67
of Law.”
Breyer’s concurring opinion twice stated that the President could
go to Congress to seek whatever authority he deemed necessary.
With his hand forced by Hamdan, that is exactly what Bush did, and
the supine Republican Congress, abetted by electorally-frightened
Democrats, responded in barely over three weeks with the Military
68
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) giving Bush everything he
wanted—including the ability to use evidence obtained by torture
prior to December 20, 2005, as well as a specific provision eliminating
judicial review except by a single appeal of a verdict by a military
commission (limited to issues of law and not fact). Breyer had stated
that the Court’s “conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground:
69
Congress had not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’” With the
MCA, the Congress deposited that check in the Executive’s account.
Some members of Congress knew they had checked their principles
at the door. Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter, for instance,
acknowledged that the MCA was unconstitutional and voted aye anyway.
Whether the MCA is consistent with the Constitution is a contested question. If Bush had asked for the MCA in 2003, Congress
would have readily handed it to him and its chances of approval
would have been far greater prior to the 2006 elections. Now, however, there are two ways to view Hamdan. One is based on separation
of powers, a demand that Congress be brought into the process of
deciding how to treat detainees. The other is a “Rule of Law” demand that procedures be consistent with the Due Process Clause. After the Court successfully cut Congress in, Congress tried to cut the
Court out with the MCA. Not surprisingly there were challenges to
the MCA even before there were trials before the commissions.
67
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Events undermined the military commission system beginning
with the repudiation of the Republicans in the 2006 elections. In the
eighteen months after the Democratic victories, more and more information about the administration policies on detainees became
public. The first challenge to the MCA was denied review over three
dissents. Then, almost three months later, after an officer involved
with the commissions called the supposed trials a farce, the Court
agreed to hear the case, meaning at least two justices who had previously voted not to review (Kennedy and Stevens), switched.
Subsequent news reports disclosed that the highest administration
officials had met in the White House to discuss which detainees to
torture and what coercive means should be used. A general in the
Pentagon was found by a military judge to have asserted unlawful
command influence by engaging in “nanomanagement of the [Guan70
tanamo] prosecutors’ office.” The former chief prosecutor testified
that Pentagon officials had pressured him to bring well-known detainees to trial before the 2008 election because otherwise “this
71
thing’s going to implode.” The Pentagon supervisor demanded that
evidence acquired by torture be used even though prosecutors have
an ethical obligation to present evidence only if they consider it reliable. And it appeared that torture may have been widespread.
Prosecutors were also told there could be no acquittals (because otherwise how could the years of detention be justified?). All in all, the
executive branch had deemed the Rule of Law outmoded in a post9/11 world.
With Roberts able to participate, the likely vote was 5-4, and given
Kennedy’s switch plus his connections with European jurists, he was
highly likely to vote with the liberals. In June, 2008, Kennedy, indeed, authored the 5-4 rebuke to both the administration and the
formerly Republican Congress by holding that the denial of habeas in
the MCA was unconstitutional and that detainees had a right to a ha72
beas hearing in a federal court. Combat Review Status Tribunals
were deemed an inadequate substitute for habeas (where a judge can
order a prisoner released). This was the ultimate defeat of the administration’s legal theory for holding detainees off-shore—because
the Court ruled that detainees did have rights under the Constitution
and federal courts could enforce them.
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Roberts’s dissent (joined by the other three conservatives) asserted that the decision was premature and accused the majority of
judicial triumphalism. The majority felt, however, that after six years
of confinement and with the prospect of lifetime incarceration in
case of possible mistaken imprisonment, that action now was necessary. (When Hamdan complained that he won at the Court and yet
received nothing for his victory, the prosecutor rejoined that he had
his name and victory in the law books.) Scalia’s dissent claimed that
the Court’s decision would cost American lives. (One hopes his ready
“I told you so” proves as wrong as Harry Blackmun’s similar assertion
73
in his Pentagon Papers dissent. )
Republicans and Democrats split completely over the decision.
Soon-to-be Republican standard bearer, John McCain, proclaimed
the decision among the worst in American history. His Democratic
counterpart, Barack Obama, hailed it as a step “toward reestablishing
74
our credibility as a nation committed to the rule of law.” Yet, as previously, the Court left important questions unanswered. What is the
substantive standard justifying continued detention? Does the decision affect those the government intends to try by military commission as well as whether the procedures before the commissions comport with due process?
Berkeley Professor John Yoo, author of the infamous “torture
memo” as head of the Office of Legal Counsel, has lamented that the
Court has not accorded Bush the deference an earlier Court granted
75
FDR. There are at least four reasons for this, the latter two being
the more important. First, and not flippantly, Bush is no FDR. Bush
made spectacular claims of authority matched with the spectacular
incompetence of his administration. Second, Bush had but two appointees (and two other reliable votes). Third, after decades of trying to put the executive into balance the Court was unlikely to reverse
course and offer the President the constitutional blank check he
wanted. Fourth, since Casey the Court has trumpeted judicial imperialism. As with bringing the executive back to the Constitution, it
seems unlikely to reverse its course.
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